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ARE CLASS ACTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Alexandra D. Lahav*
WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT. By Martin H. Redish. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

2009. Pp. x, 317. $27.95.
INTRODUCTION

Are class actions unconstitutional? Many people-defendants and conservative legislators, not to mention scholars at the American Enterprise
Institute-would like them to be. For opponents of the class action, Martin
Redish's book Wholesale Justice' provides some of the most theoretically
sophisticated arguments available. The book is a major contribution both to
the scholarly literature on class actions and to the larger political debate
about this powerful procedural device. The arguments it presents will surely
be debated in courtrooms as well as classrooms.
Redish, a leading scholar in constitutional law, federal courts, and civil
procedure, argues that studies of class actions have missed an important
point: class actions, as they currently exist, violate the Rules Enabling Act
and separation-of-powers principles. Congress delegated to the Supreme
Court the power to create rules of procedure for the federal courts.! Redish
argues that this delegation of power does not permit the Court to create rules
that transform individual causes of action into monster litigation. Worse yet,
the class action brings about this transformation in the absence of democratic accountability, resulting in a type of "stealth" legislation. There is a lot
more in Redish's book-he addresses the due process implications of the
class action for small claimants who might get nothing while their lawyers
walk away with millions, and he makes concrete proposals for reform-but
the book's greatest contribution to the ongoing debate over class actions is
this structural constitutional point. Redish tests the class action against a
coherent vision of American democracy and demonstrates the ways in
which it fails to fit into that vision. The book is original, radical, and important. It operates on both theoretical and pragmatic levels and will no doubt
play a significant role in the ongoing debate about class actions. It is especially timely as the Supreme Court revisited the relationship between class
actions and the substantive law last term in Shady Grove Orthopedic

*
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28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (2006).
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Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. and will decide four more important

class action cases in the October 2010 term.
Because Redish's critique could be devastating to the class action rule,
scholars of class actions, legislators, and consumer advocates need to address his arguments. Redish is largely right that, with a few exceptions,
those of us who write about class actions have paid too little attention to the
big constitutional and political theory issues raised by the class action rule.'
Under his definition of democratic accountability and separation of powers,
he is also right about class actions. But his theory is less persuasive when
we consider complementary constitutional ideals. In particular, the concept
of checks and balances requires the opposite conclusion: class actions are
constitutional.
This Review of Wholesale Justice proceeds in two Parts. I begin by describing Redish's arguments against the class action rule and his proposals
for reform; I then respond to them. There is not enough room to delve deeply into his arguments in this Review, but I hope that my summary in Part I
will whet the reader's appetite for more. In the second Part, I critique Redish's two central arguments and demonstrate that class actions do not
violate principles of separation of powers and that they do not constitute a
betrayal of the fundamental requirement of legislative accountability in a
democracy. I focus on these points because they are the most original and
far-reaching arguments Redish makes.
First, checks and balances, not separation of powers, is the proper metaphor for our constitutional democracy. The powers of the federal
government can no more be separated from one another than can the concepts of "substance" and "procedure." This is as true today as it was when
Madison pointed it out in several of the FederalistPapersattributed to him.
In those essays, Madison argued that the maxim that separation of powers is
a requirement of free government is not absolute and that overlap between
3.

130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).

4. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277); Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. Erica P. John Fund , Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (Jan. 7, 2011) (No. 09-1403); In re
Baycol Products Litigation, 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 61 (Sept. 28, 2010) (No. 09-1205); Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (May
24, 2010) (No. 09-893).
5. Some notable exceptions include, without limitation, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the
Social Compact Through Representative Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1239 (2001) (providing a
historical analysis of class action suits in the United States); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. Cr. REv. 337 (developing a theory of governance
of class actions with reference to political philosophy); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles
for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REv. 65 (2003) (proposing an alternative regime for governance of small claims class actions based on democratic principles); William B. Rubenstein,
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997) (examining collective decision-making procedures in civil
rights litigation).
6. 2 THE
Exchange 2005).

FEDERALIST

Nos. 47 at 93-100, 50 at 112-16 (James Madison) (The Lawbook
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the branches of government is inevitable and necessary for government to
function properly. This system of checks and balances has been a foundational principle of American democracy. It supports the power of the
Supreme Court, under the Rules Enabling Act, to set forth the class action
rule for congressional ratification. Should the class action come to be considered unwise as a policy matter, it will be reformed by political forces. In
fact, it already has.
Second, Redish's argument that class actions constitute a kind of stealth
legislation points to a real problem with modern legislation: remedies do not
reach the same level of salience as causes of action. This is true when laws
are passed with great fanfare but little effect because the remedy provided is
inadequate as well as when a minor cause of action becomes a major litigation by operation of the class action rule. At the same time, Redish fails to
appreciate the fact that although some laws are more salient to voters than
others, this does not mean that lawmakers who make these laws are unaccountable. Legislative measures that today garner no interest can tomorrow
be the object of reform. So it has been with the class action. The appropriate
solution to this accountability problem is a more robust public discussion of
procedures and remedies, including but not limited to the class action rule.
I. WHOLESALE JUSTICE

Redish makes three arguments against the class action in Wholesale Justice. First, Redish argues that class actions transform substantive rights by
collecting individual claims in a single suit. This transformation violates
separation-of-powers principles and the Rules Enabling Act because it is
achieved through the Supreme Court's rulemaking power rather than by
congressional action. Second, he argues that class actions also violate individual rights, including a right of litigants to freedom from association.
Third, he argues that settlement class actions in particular are unconstitutional because they violate Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. As
Redish himself explains, these arguments are the meat of the book (p. 61),
but he also presents some pragmatic suggestions for reformation of the class
action rule to render it constitutional.
First, Redish argues that by aggregating claims where the class members
are truly absent-"comatose" in Redish's colorful language-the class action fundamentally transforms the underlying right into something else (p.
14). That something else is not what the legislature specifically intended.
Often it is a lawsuit run by lawyers offering no meaningful compensation to
individual litigants. Redish calls this a "faux class action" (p. 14, passim).
Such a suit may have the salutary effects of deterrence, but it is not what the
legislature meant to achieve. In this way the procedural rule impermissibly
circumvents legislative intent.
A concrete example, drawn from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., will help
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clarify the issue. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates provided medical care
to a patient who assigned to it her rights to insurance benefits under a health
insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance. Allstate paid eventually, but
not on time, and refused to pay the statutory interest that had accrued as a
result of the late payment. Shady Grove was owed approximately $500 in
interest. It filed a class action lawsuit against Allstate on behalf of all the
providers that had claims for statutory interest based on overdue payments
from Allstate.8 Now, instead of being a single suit for $500, Allstate faced an
interest penalty in excess of $5,000,000 in a collective litigation. Furthermore, nearly all the members of this hypothetical lawsuit-the absent class
members-have little individual interest in filing a suit and probably would
not have filed one absent the class action. If the lawsuit yields results, the
class members may not even file claim forms because it is too complicated
or they do not care enough to do so.
Such small claims lawsuits are brought because the lawyer stands to
gain some percentage of the winnings for her trouble. As Redish explains,
"[N]o one .. . understands the purpose of this form of class action to be the
compensation of class members in the first place."9 Except, according to
Redish, the legislators who created the underlying cause of action. This state
of affairs, Redish argues, is not only wrong as a policy matter (which has
been argued before); it is also wrong as a constitutional matter because it
permits a court-promulgated rule to disfigure a substantive cause of action
(assuming that, in creating the substantive law of the state, the legislature
intended to create numerous $500 cases, not one litigation worth
$5,000,000) (pp. 73-78, 83-85).
Underlying this analysis is the principle that it is the job of the legislature to determine the scope of substantive rights. The class action is a courtpromulgated procedural rule. Proposals for amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are first drafted by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
The Advisory Committee proposes rules to the Judicial Conference of the
United States, which then decides which rules to present to Congress. If
Congress does not act by the statutory deadline, the rules go into effect.'o
Redish argues that this system violates the Presentment Clause because
Congress cannot legislate by inaction and also exceeds the federal courts'
7.

Shady Gmve, 130 S. Ct. at 1431.

8.

Id. at 1436-37.

9. P. 42. Compare Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006) (arguing
that a class action that does not directly compensate plaintiffs realizes the deterrence goals of the
substantive law), with Brian Wolfman & Alan Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 439 (1996) (arguing that the class action rule
ought to do more to protect the interest of individual plaintiffs).
10. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2006) (authorizing rulemaking power and describing
procedure). As with administrative regulations, there is often a notice and comment period before a
rule is proposed to the Judicial Conference. See generally Catherine Struve, The Paradoxof Delegation: Interpreting the FederalRules of Civil Pmcedure, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (2002) (arguing in
favor of judicial restraint in interpreting the rules, which, if they are to be amended, should be
amended through the rulemaking process).
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Article III power, which limits them to deciding cases and controversies."
What is supposed to save the rulemaking process is that the power of the
Court to make such rules is limited by the Rules Enabling Act, which states
that the rules may not "enlarge, abridge or modify any substantive right." 2
But Redish rightly points out that the distinction between substantive and
procedural laws is so tenuous as to be virtually meaningless (pp. 71-73).
Almost all procedural rules have some effect on substantive rights.
The class action is not supposed to expand legislatively created substantive rights. But, as Redish points out, this is exactly what the class action
does. In Redish's words, "[T]he class action was never designed to serve as
a freestanding legal device for the purpose of 'doing justice,' nor is it a mechanism intended to serve as a roving policeman of corporate misdeeds or
as a mechanism by which to redistribute wealth" (p. 22). This is especially
true, he explains, of mandatory class actions, which transform "the DNA of
the substantive rights" (p. 130). To the extent that the class action rule transforms rights by multiplying their effect on defendants and limiting their
benefit to plaintiffs, Redish argues, it violates separation-of-powers principles. On this point, the four Supreme Court Justices who dissented in Shady
Grove seem to agree with Redish. As Justice Ginsburg wrote in that case,
"The Court today approves Shady Grove's attempt to transform a $500 case
into a $5,000,000 award, although the State creating the right to recover has
proscribed this alchemy."' 3
Second, Redish argues that the class action subverts individual rights by
erasing an individual's cause of action in favor of the collective. Redish explains that litigant autonomy in the resort to governmental processesjudicial, legislative, or administrative-is a central value of our democracy
(p. 136). As a due process matter, rights belong to individuals and cannot be
taken away by operation of a procedural rule unless individuals willingly
choose to participate in that process (p. 136). Another way of thinking about
this is that litigants have a right to freedom of association (pp. 159-62) or,
rather, freedom to be free from association with a class. For this reason, Redish believes that both mandatory and opt-out class actions violate due
process and suggests that damages class actions should only be opt in (p.
174-75). This means that claimants who did nothing will not be part of the
class action and will not be precluded from subsequently bringing a competing lawsuit. It is noteworthy that Redish reaches the conclusion that the
injunctive class action-the primary procedural vehicle for obtaining the
permanent enforcement of the autonomy-promoting right to equal protection
of the laws (especially with respect to school desegregation)-is unconstitutional precisely on autonomy grounds (p. 137).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78
11.
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1450-52 (2003) (arguing that, because it fails to meet the constitutional
requirements of presentment, the class action rule "is but a guideline or rule of thumb whose force
derives only from consistent practice and the wisdom that the rule embodies").
12.

28 U.S.C. § 2072.

13.

Shady Gmve, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Third, Redish argues that settlement class actions violate the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III (pp. 176-225). A settlement class
action describes the situation where lawyers file both a class action complaint and a proposal of settlement at once. The idea is that the class action
lawsuit need never be litigated because the parties have already come to an
agreement as to how to resolve it. Because the parties have already agreed
on a resolution, Redish argues, they lack the case or controversy Article III
requires. He explains that "[tlhere is simply no . . . 'case' or 'controversy' to
include a proceeding in which, from the outset, nothing is disputed and the
parties are in complete agreement" (p. 178). Instead, the parties present a
done deal in order to have the court ratify the settlement and obtain preclusive effect, or in the language of class action scholars, "global peace."14 If
the court agrees to certify the settlement class action and approves the settlement, all the claimants who failed to opt out will be bound. In Redish's

view, this is a misuse of the court system. Returning to the theme of separation of powers, Redish explains that "[a]s the one branch that is not
representative of or accountable to the populace, the judiciary may threaten
core democratic values unless its actions are tied to performance of the traditional judicial function of dispute resolution" (pp. 179-80). Redish
recognizes cases where the Supreme Court has strayed from this
position-in the appointment of Article III judges to the Federal Sentencing
Commission and in permitting the appointment and supervision of independent counsel'-but distinguishes them on the grounds that they are
special cases and in any event likely wrongly decided (pp. 205-06).
Can class actions be made constitutional? Redish proposes some farreaching reforms that he argues will legitimize the class action procedure,
but, as he admits, they will also limit class actions considerably. He makes
three key proposals. First, settlement class actions should be recognized as
an unconstitutional violation of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. Second, courts should hold mandatory class actions (that is,
injunctive and "limited fund" class actions) unconstitutional because they
violate an individual's due process rights, except in the very limited category where the defendant may be subject to inconsistent obligations. Third,
all money damages class actions should be permitted only on an opt-in basis, unless litigants can demonstrate that the claims at issue "though
sufficiently large to reasonably justify the filing of a claim form as part of a
settlement or judicial award, would be insufficiently large to justify individual suit" (p. 231).
These proposals are very radical indeed. It is not clear how many class
actions would be able to be certified under this regime. Civil rights class
actions, like those based on gender or race discrimination, would not be
permitted at all. While individuals would still be able to obtain injunctive
relief against a defendant, the courts would have no mechanism by which to
14.

RICHARDA. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT

214 (2007).

15. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Federal Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (oversight of independent counsel).
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oversee structural change. Instead, plaintiffs would have to pursue a costly
strategy of multiple litigations to try and convince a defendant that it should
abandon discriminatory policies. With respect to money-damages class actions, opt-in actions in the consumer context would not be very effective in
achieving the deterrent purpose of consumer-protection laws because too
few class members respond to class notices. Many consumer-protection
class actions involve amounts too small to justify individual suit. Redish
would let such claims proceed on an opt-out basis only if they are large
enough to justify filing a claim. Falling through the cracks of Redish's proposal are claims against defendant corporations who steal very small
amounts from a class of consumers. Although such illegal actions cost consumers individually very little-perhaps too little to justify bringing a
claim-they amount to an unlawful windfall that the consumer-protection
laws are intended to redress.
II. MANUFACTURING JUSTICE

If Redish is right, then the current class action rule is unconstitutional.
What is more, his proposals for reform would render the revised class action
rule next to useless for the vindication of civil and consumer rights, among
others. There is a lot at stake. So is he right? I disagree with Redish for two
reasons. First, "checks and balances," not "separation of powers," is a better
description of our constitutional order. Second, at least with respect to class
actions, the requirement of democratic accountability (which is a matter of
political theory, not constitutional law) has been met. My critique focuses on
the arguments about separation of powers and democratic accountability
because they are central to Redish's thesis that the class action rule, as currently structured, is unconstitutional, and because they are the most original
contribution of the book.
A. Checks and Balances

The conception of separation of powers that is the basis for Redish's
book is both empirically inaccurate and normatively undesirable. The
branches of government are not in fact separate, nor should they be. The
idea of strict separation of powers originates with Montesquieu, but of
course Montesquieu erred when he stated that the powers of the three
branches of government can or ought to be separate. Our government is one
of overlapping powers that check one another. 6 This was one of the key insights Madison explored in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 48,
Madison argued against absolute separation of powers, writing that
"unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation

16. Judith Resnik convincingly demonstrates an analogous mistake in the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
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which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained." 7 He elaborated on this idea in FederalistNo.
51, stating that "the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists of giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others."" "Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition."'9
The Supreme Court has never taken an absolutist or formalist view of
separation of powers. As Justice Jackson explained in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."20 Congress has the power to
create Article I courts, for example. 2' It also has the power to delegate rulemaking authority to the federal courts.2 Redish recognizes that these holdings are not likely to change, although he disagrees with them.23 But the
Supreme Court was right to uphold the Rules Enabling Act. In particular, the
Court did not usurp congressional power by promulgating Rule 23 because
Congress has reviewed and approved that rule through the usual process of
legislative enactment several times. The dialogue between the Court and
Congress with respect to class actions demonstrates how well a system of
"separateness but interdependence" can work.
The debate in the courts and Congress about the desirability of the class
action is a rather nice example of the type of dialogue that can occur between the overlapping branches of government. The class action rule was
drafted under the auspices of the judicial branch and ratified by Congress.
Congress revisited that rule on several occasions. For example, in 1995 legislators became concerned about the proliferation of securities class actions
and passed the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
which heightened pleading requirements for securities class actions and dictated who could be a representative plaintiff in such a class action.2 More
recently, Congress reconsidered the class action rule in 2005 when it passed
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), legislation that essentially
25
federalized class actions. That act granted broad jurisdiction to the federal
courts over all class actions where any class member is from a different state
than any defendant and the matter in controversy exceeds five million dol-

17.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 48, supra note 6, at 101.

18.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, supra note 6, at 117.

19.

Id.

20.

343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

21.

Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565-67 (1933).

22.

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

23. P. 64. Redish is in good company disagreeing with me; Justice Frankfurter made a very
similar argument in his dissent in Sibbach.
24.

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).

25.

Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
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lars. This legislation sweeps most class actions into federal court. CAFA
was hotly debated and demonstrates both that class actions are salient to
lawmakers and the electorate and that Congress approves of the way the
federal courts handle them.
The debate over CAFA proves that legislators were well aware of the effects of the class action rule on individual rights and the manner in which
the class action rule transforms small individual causes of action into largescale litigation. For example, Senator Herb Kohl, who supported the bill,
explained, "Right now, people across the country can be dragged into lawsuits unaware of their rights and unarmed on the legal battlefield. What our
bill does is give back to regular people their rights and representation."
Senator Arlen Specter said of the class action, "What we are really talking
about here is a system that impacts the vast majority of people who live in
this country."28 Senator Barbara Boxer, an opponent of CAFA, described the
benefits of class actions for individuals like the father of a girl killed by a
faulty airbag in a Chrysler minivan, a Wal-Mart worker cheated out of overtime pay, and a firefighter who brought a class action against a credit card
company "for cheating her and other consumers out of their vehicles ...
destroying their credit ratings in the process."2 9 CAFA also signals that Congress understands the class action to be a form .of public law litigation, an
idea Redish rejects (pp. 21-24). Congress included a provision that requires
notices of settlement to be sent to "appropriate" federal or state officials.3 o
This demonstrates mistrust of private lawyers as well as the importance of
class actions for the enforcement of socially beneficial laws.
In sum, Congress observed what it regarded as deficiencies in the way
class actions were being adjudicated and acted to correct those deficiencies.
In both the case of the PSLRA and CAFA, Congress, after debate, specifically ratified the ability of the federal courts to adjudicate claims on a classwide basis by enacting legislation. As a policy matter, that legislation may
be flawed, but that is a separate issue from the constitutional concern Redish
raises about default procedural rules overstepping legislative prerogatives.
The legislature is well aware of the effect of the class action device on
substantive law. Large-scale revisions of the class action rule are not the
only occasion that Congress has acted to limit the effects of that rule. In
1996, Congress limited the ability of legal-services providers that receive
federal funds from representing clients in class actions." The Truth in
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). The statute requires the federal court to remand the case to
state court when more than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the same state as the
primary defendant and makes remand discretionary when between one-third and two-thirds of the
class members are citizens of the same state as the primary defendant. Id. § 1332(d)(3H4).
27.

151 CONG. REC. 661 (2005).

28.

151 CONG. REC. S1001 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005).

29.

Id. at S998.

30.

28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2006).

31. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
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Lending Act ("TILA") specifically limits the available remedies in class
actions brought under that law to the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of the
net worth of the defendant." Congress is certainly capable of writing legislation that carves out or limits class actions. It does not matter that Rule 23 is
a default rule.
The dialogue about class actions is bilateral, flowing also from the Court
to Congress. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court began its opin-

ion by describing a report from the United States Judicial Conference Ad
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation." That report recounted the litigation
crisis caused by the influx of asbestos cases into the federal courts and concluded that real reform required a legislative solution. 4 With no such
solution forthcoming, manufacturers and plaintiffs' attorneys attempted to
resolve the litigation through a settlement class action of the kind Redish
argues is -unconstitutional. While the Court cited procedural requirements as
a reason to overturn the settlement,35 I suggest the real reason was substantive-the settlement traded off the interests of some clients against others in
36
unacceptable ways. Amchem effectively stopped the certification of mass
tort class actions. The Court's cry for help was unanswered; no legislative
solution to the asbestos litigation crisis has been forthcoming. Instead, mass
tort cases have settled on an aggregate basis through negotiated settlements,
raising similar concerns to those Redish puts forth, but without the formal
protections of the class action device.
There is a contradiction inherent in Redish's approach to the separationof-powers problem. Redish believes that the Court has overstepped its
bounds in "legislating" a far-reaching procedural rule that transforms substantive causes of action. At the same time, he wants the courts-that
countermajoritarian institution-to be the body that polices the lines between the branches.
B. Accountabilityfor the Rules in a Modem Democracy

Redish's second central argument is that class actions violate principles
of democratic accountability that are central to our form of government.
This argument is based not on specific constitutional requirements, but in
political theory. Redish argues that the class action is "stealth" legislation
which transforms small individual rights or claims into collective monster

33.

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2006).
521 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1997).

34.

Id. at 598.

35.

Id. at 627-29.

32.

36. The Amchem Products dissent supports this view. See id. at 630 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("I am uncertain about the tenor of an opinion that seems to suggest the
settlement is unfair.").
37. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383 (2007) (arguing against the privatization of the process of
resolving mass torts through aggregate settlement).
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litigation. It is stealthy because ordinary laws creating, for all appearances,
individual causes of action are expanded by the class action device into
something different, and legislators are not likely to be held accountable for
this expansion because it operates by default through a procedural rule of
which the public may not be aware. While I disagree with Redish that the
public is unaware of the class action device, I share his general criticism of
the poor level of discourse in American political life regarding the relationship between rights and remedies.
The key to Redish's argument that class actions are stealth legislation is
his conception of accountability. Redish writes that "those who make basic
sub-constitutional choices of social policy must (1) have been chosen by the
electorate, and (2) be accountable to the electorate if they wish to continue
in office" (p. 46). In order to hold legislators accountable, laws ought to be
transparent. In Redish's view, the class action enables a kind of secret-or
perhaps obscure-legislation because it is a "process whereby governing
law is surreptitiously transformed into a different or contrary law" (p. 49).
This is an overstatement. Class actions do not transform underlying causes
of action into a contrary law, nor do they make one law into another. Instead, class actions multiply exponentially the effect of a particular law on
defendants. They do not change the litigation very much from the plaintiffs'
point of view.
In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court considered the question of how
class actions should be viewed: as a procedure for aggregating individual
claims or as a transformative procedural device." The majority of the Justices viewed the class action from the class members' point of view. They
defined the class action as a method for aggregating existing claims." The
dissenters, like Redish, defined the class action from the defendants' point
of view, presenting a picture of the class action as a mechanism that transforms a small case into massive litigation.4 Both the four dissenting Justices
and Redish too readily buy into the defense-side argument that, as a result of
its size, the class action is a form of legalized "blackmail."4' There is no empirical evidence to support that claim.42 Since fewer than all eligible
plaintiffs will file lawsuits, the class action transforms a case that from the
defendants' perspective might have been valued at $500 to one valued at
38.

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).

39. Justices Scalia, Sotomayor, Roberts, and Thomas reasoned in part that a class action is an
aggregation of claims. Id. at 1443. Justice Stevens concurred with the plurality in this respect. Id. at
1448.
40.

Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

41. See Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357 (2003) (arguing that the blackmail thesis is empirically and normatively baseless).
42. See id. Redish supports his position by citing to Judge Posner's opinion in In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). P. 62 n.l. This opinion provided no empirical
evidence to support the blackmail thesis and should not be relied upon for anything more than a
theoretical account of what the class action device might do in some cases. In any event, the type of
class action at issue there-a mass tort class action-is now essentially forbidden.
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$5,000,000. But the members of the class action still have a claim on their
share of the $5,000,000. Thus, from the class plaintiff's perspective, the suit
remains one for $500. Redish is also concerned with the extent to which the
class action suit is large from the lawyers' perspective: a share of
$5,000,000 yields more money with less work for the lawyer than a series of
$500 suits.
Missing from the analysis is the role of the class action in enforcing the
rule of law. If a defendant has violated the law, it should be made to pay an
appropriate amount of damages. The law does not absolve a defendant from
liability merely because it harmed tens of thousands instead of one individual. But all these questions-of how best to enforce the law, whether
claimants are really getting $500, whether lawyers' incentive to bring these
lawsuits is too strong, and whether lawyers are overpaid-are policy questions about how well the class action is policed by the courts, rather than
questions about democratic accountability.
To the extent that the effect of the class action device on enforcement is
hidden, it may present an accountability problem. Redish's approach to accountability operates on two levels. At the retail (or micro) level, he is
concerned about the lawyers who effectively run class actions not being sufficiently accountable to the class. He calls this a "faux" class action because
it is not really a lawsuit to vindicate the rights of the class, but at its best
merely a deterrence suit that benefits lawyers (p. 14). In the class action literature this is usually described as an agent-principal problem.43 The same
issue is reflected at the wholesale (or macro) level when elected representatives enact "stealth" legislation that is not accountable to the electorate. This
macro level is where Redish's argument is most novel.
This accountability argument raises two issues. First, what does accountability mean? It is useful to unpack the question of accountability and
consider it as a function of two concepts: salience and access. Second, to
what extent are class actions special and to what extent are other rules and
laws "stealth" legislation? The lamentable mismatch between rights and
remedies that Redish points to is a much greater concern with respect to
more obscure laws.
1. DemocraticAccountability: Salience and Access

To understand the extent to which a procedural rule such as the class action violates principles of democratic accountability, a more nuanced view
of accountability is needed.. Democratic accountability really has two aspects." The first is salience-that is, the public prominence of the issue.45
43. Although he describes it a bit differently, I think Redish's micro-level discussion of the
accountability problem between lawyers and class members is not so different from the prevailing
agent-principal analysis.
44. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal
Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy? 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 113, 122 (2005).
45.

See id. at 122-23.
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This is the aspect on which Redish focuses. The second is access-legal
rules that enable the citizenry to affect the decision-making process.
As a general matter, Redish notes, most people would agree that the
rules of civil procedure lack salience to the general electorate (p. 62). They
are considered at best technical and at worst "mind-numbing.A But if ever
there were an exception to this general perception, it is the class action.
Lawsuits in which class allegations are made are only a tiny fraction of the
federal court docket-perhaps 1 percent.48 Often class allegations are not
followed by motions for class certification, meaning that it is probable that
many such suits are not in the end class actions. 49 Despite the low class action caseload, class actions are a substantial part of the public discussion of
litigation. They receive more than their fair share of the media airwaves and
legislative time, as the debate over CAFA illustrates.
Not only are class actions salient on a national level, but individuals also
have access to class actions, in the sense that many of us have been members of class actions. We have received notices in the mail and gathered that
while we will only obtain a very small recovery, the lawyers managing these
cases will get millions. Class members are entitled to call the lawyers in
charge of the case and there is often a toll free number available for that
purpose. Class members are also entitled to write to the court as well as to
appear at a fairness hearing about the settlement.o
The problem is that the class actions to which citizens have accessclass actions of which they are actually a member-lack salience. This is
either because class action notices are indeed mind numbing or because the
amounts at stake are simply too small to bother over. Most people do not
call that toll free number, protest the settlement in person or in writing, or
even respond to the notice. Opt-out rates are low." There is little data on
claiming rates in class actions,52 and this lacuna itself ought to raise
46.

See id. at 123.

47. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Parliamentarianin Role as Health Bill Referee, N.Y TIMES,
March 14, 2010, at Al (describing parliamentarian Alan S. Frumin as "a whiz at mastering the
mind-numbing rules of civil procedure" in law school).
48. One study found that 1,250 cases filed in the federal courts between January and June
2007 had class allegations and an additional 1,104 were labor class actions, which I think would not
offend Redish because they are opt-in class actions not brought under Rule 23. See EMERY G. LEE,
III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNEss ACT oF
2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT 3 (2008), http://www.fjc.gov/library/
fjc catalog.nsf (search for "The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005"). To put this in
perspective, 245,427 cases were filed in the federal courts in 2008. This author's very rough estimate is that, during the period of January through June 2008, only 1%of the cases filed in the
federal courts made class allegations.
49.

See id.

50.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

51. See Lahav, supra note 5, at 83 (discussing low opt-out rates and the limited utility of optout rights).
52. Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparentare Class Action Outcomes? EmpiricalResearch on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data (RAND Working Paper
Series WR-599-ICJ, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1206315 (concluding that little
data is available).
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concerns. Existing data are not encouraging. For example, in the Ford Explorer class action settlement, class members were offered vouchers for the
purchase of Ford vehicles. Of the 1,647 claims approved, only 148 redeemed their vouchers.
Similarly, where class actions are most salient-at the level of national
debate about the so-called "litigation explosion"-there is little access for
ordinary citizens. People can appear at class action fairness hearings as objectors, but in order to object one has to be a member of the class. Citizens
can contact their congressperson or protest about class actions, but these
attempts at influencing the national debate over class actions have limited
effect in comparison to the direct access available to class members in any
individual class action lawsuit.
Furthermore, while citizens may be concerned about class actions at a
national level, many such lawsuits proceed at the state level. A state class
action may affect national companies, but individuals who are not citizens
of that state cannot influence its laws. The federalization of class actions
under CAFA can be seen as a response to this problem. On the one hand, by
federalizing class actions, CAFA brought these cases into the federal system, where they are more salient. On the other, CAFA removed class actions
from state power, where citizens are more likely to have access to the political process and therefore have influence over its outcomes. Allowing cases
to proceed at the state level will lead to inconsistent rules but more experimentation. States can amend their class action rules to deal with the policy
problems Redish raises, as New York did when it enacted a class action rule
that prohibited cases invoking statutory penalties as a default rule to proceed
as class actions.5 Other states have expanded their reach and certified national class actions.
It is a paradox of modern life that people are least interested in the
things that they can most influence. This paradox is not resolved by removing class actions to the federal courts. Class members are no more likely to
be interested in a federal class action than a state action (although a federal
class action may be harder to certify so there will be less need for them to be
interested). Furthermore, the courts are the governmental branch that probably offers the least access for ordinary citizens; this is a large part of
Redish's quarrel with the rulemaking process. Having this countermajoritarian institution hold that class actions are unconstitutional does not resolve
the access problem. Lack of interest on the part of the citizenry and alien-

53. Final Report on Settlement Claims and Voucher Redemption, at 2, Ford Explorer Cases,
JCCP Nos. 4266 & 4270 (Cal. Super. Ct. March 8, 2010).
54.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006).

55. See Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U.
L. REv. 2001, 2015-22 (2008).

PA.

56. See Hills, supra note 44, at 124-25. Hills explains that individuals have more access at
the local level, yet national issues have more salience, as evidenced by the fact that voter turnout is
lower at the local level than for presidential elections. Id.
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ation from large-scale political institutions are fundamental problems of
modem public life that go beyond the class action rule.
2. Stealth Legislation: Know Your Rights

This brings us to the rulemaking process. Redish's main critique is that
this process is structurally improper. Congress, not the Court, should be
making the rules, and therefore the system, which he thinks often yields
good results, is "inherently defective" (p. 66). But one might also ask
whether the rulemaking process is sufficiently transparent, whether it obtains the attention of informed citizens and provides them with access to
decision making. This is a different accountability problem. We might be
concerned that this process can be captured by special interests or that the
Judicial Conference will prefer rules that are good for judges or the court
system rather than those that the citizenry more generally might prefer. As
many commentators have demonstrated, what started in 1938 as a process of
rulemaking by experts who thought procedure was neutral as to substance
has become a politicized process run by special interests who know that "I'll
let you write the substance ... and you let me write the procedure, and I'll
screw you every time." These are important concerns, although I am not
sure that assigning rulemaking to Congress directly would be' an improvement over the current regime.
Redish distinguishes the class action as stealth legislation both from delegation to administrative agencies and from judicial decision making in
cases where the legislature has failed to act. In the case of administrative
delegation, he argues, agencies are indirectly accountable as part of the executive branch (p. 49). In the case of judicial lawmaking, the judicial branch
is merely "filling a vacuum" because "the court must determine.the governing law, simply to determine who wins" (p. 49). These justifications, he
claims, do not apply to the class action, where the judiciary transforms a
substantive right through a procedural device without express legislative
consent. The argument is not convincing. If the judicial branch is allowed to
"fill a vacuum" then surely it should be allowed to apply existing procedural
rules that have been ratified by Congress to the substantive law.
More convincing is Redish's concern about accountability more generally; that is, that Congress is making laws that do not say what they mean.
He is worried that the apparent mismatch between substance and procedure
misleads the public and believes that if the truth came out there would be
"widespread public outrage" (p. 52). Class actions are so highly visible in
the media and legislatures that this seems to me unlikely.-" On a broader
level, this observation has some merit: the mismatch between rights and
57. Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
For one version of this politicization story, see Robert G. Bone, "To Encourage Settlement": Rule
68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1561, 1612-13 (2008) (discussing the amendment process of Rule 68).
58.

Redish offers no empirical evidence to support his intuition.
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remedies is present throughout the law. The relationship of people with the
legal system is complex and sometimes contradictory." There are many situations in which laws are not well publicized so people do not know their
rights, or limitations on remedies are not well publicized so people think
they have rights when in fact there is no remedy.
Many statutes are not readily understood by potential plaintiffs, and this
means that people do not always vindicate their rights. For example, in civil
rights cases brought under § 1983, individuals who prevail are entitled to
attorneys' fees.6 But this right is not absolute. A defendant can make an offer of judgment anytime before trial and if the plaintiff receives less than
that offer, that defendant need not pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees from the
time the offer was made even if the plaintiff ultimately prevails.6 Defendants are allowed to offer plaintiffs everything they want in exchange for
giving up their attorneys' fees, making it harder for civil rights lawyers to
bring certain kinds of cases.6 ' Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot obtain attorneys' fees when their lawsuit was merely a "catalyst" that led the defendant
to change an illegal practice.6 Nor can plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees
when they obtain a preliminary injunction if that injunction is subsequently
dissolved or reversed.6' This insidious "disarming" of the private attorney
general is just as, and perhaps more, troubling than any abuses of the class
action device. Yet these limitations get much less attention, though the
rights at stake are constitutionally protected.
On the substantive side of things, do most people know that they can file
a lawsuit for a minimum of $100 when a business willfully prints more than
the last five digits of their credit card number on a receipt and that if they
prevail they are entitled to attorneys' fees?66 Before Lily Ledbetter's case
made it to the Supreme Court, how many people knew that they only had
180 days after an adverse employment decision to sue for pay discrimination on the basis of race or gender? Because the populace did not know of
this limitation, the decision in the Ledbetter case raised ire. But that does
not mean that the decision was illegitimate because there was not sufficient

59. See generally SUSAN S. SILBEY & PATRICIA EWICK, THE COMMON PLACE OF
(1998) (providing a historical account and analyzing the relationship of the people to the law).
60.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).

61.

Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1985).

62.

Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 738-43 (1986).
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63. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 600-01 (2001).
64.

Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007).

65.

Pamela S. Karlan, Disarmingthe PrivateAttorney General,2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183.

66. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006). Redish would oppose permitting such suits to proceed as
class actions, but I wonder, who would bring such a suit individually?
67. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (statute of
limitations on Title VII pay discrimination cases is 180 days). But see Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (amending Title VII to recognize that a discriminatory
compensation decision occurs each time compensation is paid).
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institutional accountability. It was just wrong. The question is not one of
process, but of norms.
Most of us do not know our legal rights. We might be outraged to learn
how limited some rights are. And we might be surprised to learn how beneficial others are. If every obscure law or law with a mismatch between right
and remedy were unconstitutional, few laws could remain on the books.
Class actions are big and so they present an easy target, but the real target
should be the smaller laws that nobody pays attention to, the laws that are
not salient and with respect to which there is little access for the ordinary
citizen, the laws that undo our rights piecemeal. Among the least salient of
these laws are the ordinary procedural rules that limit access to justice. Laws
that silently limit people's ability to vindicate their rights, particularly their
civil rights, are constitutional. But they are also wrong as a policy matter.
We would do well to heed Redish's call to pay more attention to the creation
not only of rights and causes of action, but of remedies for vindicating them.
CONCLUSION

Wholesale Justice will occupy an important place in the debate over
class actions because it is the only sophisticated, sustained critique of the
class action based in constitutional law and political theory. The book
should appeal to anyone interested in our civil litigation system, not only
those who study class actions. It also provides an excellent articulation of
these arguments for use in the classroom. But as I have argued, the book
should be read with care. Neither separation of powers nor the principle of
democratic accountability calls for judicial invalidation of the class action
rule. If the class action is to be reformed, it will be on a policy basis, not a
constitutional one. Nor is the legal process through which this procedural
device is created the real issue. The real issue ought to be whether the class
action is socially beneficial. The book makes a larger point than this, however. Setting Redish's arguments in the broader context of our civil justice
system, we should take seriously his concerns about the extent to which
procedures and remedies stealthily prevent the vindication of substantive
rights.
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